

~~SECRET~~ (WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS)  
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington 25, D. C.

In Reply Refer to:  
I-15,297/61

12 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Unprogrammed Military Assistance in Case of a  
Berlin Crisis

The enclosures contain pertinent passages excerpted from an exchange of letters between my brother and myself.

It will be observed that I opened this subject in a most personal way and restricted discussion at EUCOM to a few top people. The MAAGs have not been consulted. My brother responded quickly upon belatedly receiving my letter (he was away on a trip for some time) and his reply should be considered only a preliminary effort.

However, the subject is one which should be receiving thought here, and I am therefore making this distribution as a stimulus to thinking.



W. B. Palmer  
Director of Military Assistance

2 Encls.

Downgraded at three-year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 years.  
DOD Dir. 5200.10

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EXTRACT

21 June 1961

General Charles D. Palmer  
Deputy US Commander-in-Chief Europe

Dear Charlie:

\* \* \* \* \*

If you have a crisis over Berlin, what sort of unprogrammed demands upon Military Assistance are likely to develop, and (if possible) in what magnitude? All I am asking is an educated guess at the fairly simple question I have posed above. \* \* \* \* \*

Since you have large war reserves of EUCOM stocks, your educated guess may be "nothing". If so, fine. On the other hand, if we might have to go to Congress for a large appropriation to cover unprogrammed demands for trucks, or tanks, or armored weapons carriers or several kinds of aircraft including helicopters, it would be a good idea to have some concept of what the nature of such unprogrammed demands might be.

I do not think this subject should be discussed outside of the upper levels of your staff, and my inquiry is strictly on the "old boy" level.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ W. B. Palmer

W. B. Palmer  
Director of Military Assistance

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EXTRACT

5 July 1961

General W. B. Palmer  
Director of Military Assistance

Dear Willie:

Reference your letter of 21 June pertaining to possible calls of additional MA in conjunction with Berlin crises, I have had the boys give it a fast, high-level look.

To answer your question about what sort of unprogrammed demands upon Military Assistance are likely to develop in such an event, my best educated guess is we might ask for MAP money up to about \$170 million to provide hardware for immediate delivery between any date subsequent to now and 1 January 1962.

This would be over and above the requirement contained in the FY 1962 program now before Congress and would cover trucks, tanks, communication equipment and other conventional armament. Transport aircraft and helicopters were not considered feasible for inclusion in this list due to long lead times for procurement and training. Equipment required must come from existing stocks or reserves other than those here in Europe.

I have provided a dollar magnitude by country and some estimated quantities of major items within these dollars in the attached table. This gives an example of our general drift of thinking. It includes some estimated requirements for spare parts in support of an intensified activity rate and also includes some attrition aircraft which look like "small potato" items when viewed in the "big picture".

An increased intensity of preparedness as well as other actions might result in demands by Greece and Turkey for additional defense support. This is a hard one to figure. My best guess is that Greece would need up to about \$15 million and Turkey somewhere near \$50 million in additional defense support funds.

This has been limited to the NATO area but might well have repercussions in Iran and Pakistan. Would be glad to line up some good guesses on other countries if you wish.

Faithfully,  
/s/ Charlie  
CHARLES D. PALMER  
General, U.S. Army

1 Incl  
Table of Dollar  
Magnitude

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MAP PRICE</u> <u>\$ MILLIONS</u>
<u>BELGIUM</u>		
3	RF 86	0.3
39	105 mm How.	6.2
54	M-41 Tanks	3.0
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	<u>2.1</u>
	TOTAL	11.6
<u>DENMARK</u>		
24	105 SP How and 12 155 SP How.	4.3
12	Tank Rec Veh and 229 APC's	10.5
	C&E Equipment - VRC and GRC Radios	1.0
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	<u>6.3</u>
	TOTAL	22.1
<u>GREECE</u>		
40	M-47 Tank with Spares	3.1
206	APC's	6.9
27	105 mm How. M-2	0.4
200	Trk Cgo 2 1/2 Ton (with spares)	4.0
	C&E Equipment - VRC and GRC Radios	4.0
	105 mm Ammo	3.0
	POL - JP-4, MOGAS	3.9
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	<u>5.5</u>
	TOTAL	30.8

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MAP PRICE \$ MILLIONS</u>
<u>ITALY</u>		
53	Tank M-41A1	2.6
357	APC's	11.5
7	F-86K	0.4
8	F-84F	0.4
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	7.4
	Conventional Ammo, 105 mm	<u>5.0</u>
	TOTAL	27.3
<u>NETHERLANDS</u>		
108	Combat Vehicle Weapons, 105 mm	1.9
56	APC's	5.5
3650	M-60 MG	4.0
	C&E Equipment - MRC, MPQ	4.7
	Mobile POL Supply System	<u>2.0</u>
	TOTAL	18.1
<u>NORWAY</u>		
6	RF 86	0.6
14	105 mm Howitzer	2.3
56	106 mm Recoilless Rifles	3.5
129	APC's	12.7
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	<u>7.4</u>
	TOTAL	26.5

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MAP PRICE</u> <u>\$ MILLIONS</u>
	<u>TURKEY</u>	
26	How SP 105 mm M-52	1.4
12	How SP 155 mm	1.1
42	How 155 mm Towed M1A1	1.8
16	How 8" M2A1W/Crg	0.4
135	Rifle 120 mm X M-89	0.1
11,654	Recoilless Rifle Gun M-62	3.5
116	Tank Medium M-47	2.4
279	APC's	7.5
1500	Trk Cgo 2 1/2 Ton M-59	9.2
	POL - JP-4, MOGAS, Diesel	2.5
	Follow-on Spares - Acft, Vehicles, C&E	<u>3.0</u>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32.9</b>

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